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Abstract Computational trust mechanisms aim to produce
trust ratings from both direct and indirect information about
agents’ behaviour. Subjective Logic (SL) has been widely
adopted as the core of such systems via its fusion and dis-
count operators. In recent research we revisited the seman-
tics of these operators to explore an alternative, geometric
interpretation. In this paper we present a principled desider-
ata for discounting and fusion operators in SL. Building upon
this we present operators that satisfy these desirable proper-
ties, including a family of discount operators. We then show,
through a rigorous empirical study, that specific, geometri-
cally interpreted operators significantly outperform standard
SL operators in estimating ground truth. These novel op-
erators offer real advantages for computational models of
trust and reputation, in which they may be employed with-
out modifying other aspects of an existing system.
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1 Introduction
Trust forms the backbone of human and artificial societies,
improving robustness of interactions by restricting the ac-
tions of untrusted entities and mitigating the impact of un-
trusted information (Sensoy et al 2013). Within the multi-
agent systems community (Sabater and Sierra 2005), the
problem of how to determine the degree of trustworthiness
to assign to other agents is foundational for the notion of
agency and for its defining relation of acting “on behalf of”.
Trustworthiness is utilised when selecting partners for in-
teractions; distrusted agents are less likely to be engaged,
reducing their influence over the system.
Trust mechanisms aim to compute a level of trust based
on direct and second-hand interactions between agents. The
latter, commonly referred to as reputational information, is
obtained from other agents which have interacted with the
subject of the assessment. Aspects of such systems that have
been examined include how to minimise the damage caused
by collusion between agents (Haghpanah and des Jardins
2012), the nature of reputation information (Jøsang et al
2012), and examining trust in specific contexts and agent
interaction configurations (Burnett and Oren 2012).
In this paper we strengthen the analysis of an alternative
to Jøsang’s Subjective Logic (SL) discounting and combi-
nation operators (Jøsang 2001), which we have previously
described in (Cerutti et al 2013a). In particular, we enlarged
the range of proposed discounting operators in order to pro-
vide a more comprehensive experimental evaluation. Instead
of providing single operators we present a general approach,
from which an entire family of operators can be derived that
are proved to be compliant with specific desirable proper-
ties. From our analysis we can deduce some new interest-
ing statistical properties of Jøsang’s operators, as well as
of the proposed operators. This evaluation methodology in-
troduces two different metrics: the expected value distance
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from the ground truth, and the geometric distance from the
ground truth. According to the former, our family of opera-
tors are shown to be almost equivalent to Jøsang’s original
operators, and significantly more accurate in one case. Using
the latter metric, our operators compute reputation opinions
closer to the ground truth than Jøsang’s, with the exception
of one case. Further, one of our proposed discounting opera-
tors outperforms the traditional SL operator on both metrics.
In the next section we present a desiderata for discount-
ing and fusion operators, grounded on how trust models such
as SL are employed in practice. After a brief overview of
Jøsang’s SL in Section 3, we formalise the desiderata in Sec-
tion 4 considering SL opinions, and show that they are not
satisfied by existing SL operators. We describe our proposed
operators in Section 5, and prove that they comply with the
desirable properties presented. Then, in Section 6, we de-
scribe our experiment designed to conduct the comparative
study among the operators, and, in Section 7, we evaluate
our results to determine their significance. We summarise
the conclusions that can be drawn from this study in Section
8. In order to improve the readability of the paper, proofs of
the described results can be found in Appendix B (Appendix
A discusses the mathematical foundations of the proposed
operators).
2 A Desiderata for Discounting and Fusion Operators
In this work we focus on trust relations where an agent re-
ferred to as the truster — X — “depends” on a trustee —
Yi — (Castelfranchi and Falcone 2010). As a concrete ex-
ample, we examine the case where a trustee is responsible
for providing some information to a truster, as exemplified
by the following scenario.
Example 1 Let X be a military analyst who is collecting
evidence in order to decide whether or not a specific area
contains a certain type of weapon. In particular, he needs a
datum m from two sensors Y1 and Y2, each of which has a
history of failure, thus affecting the trust X places in them.
Here, X is the truster, and Y1 and Y2 the trustees.
In such a scenario, the degree of trustworthiness of Y1
and Y2 is normally computed from historical data (Jøsang
and McAnally 2004). Suppose that X asks Y1 and Y2 about
m. Let us consider the case where Y informs that it believes
that m holds (we write Y to indicate either Y1 or Y2).
Example 1 (Continued) Belief. Suppose that Y answers
that m holds with absolute certainty. However, Y has had
a history of (random) failures, which means that X does not
completely trust Y ’s reports. In this situation, it seems rea-
sonable for X to derive an opinion about the likelihood of
m with an upper limit equivalent to its trust in Y .
The above scenario gives us an intuition about a first
desideratum concerning discounting opinions, viz.:
desD1: when the trustworthiness degree of a trustee
Y is derived from historical data, if Y informsX that
m holds with absolute certainty,X should believem
as much as it believes Y .
On the other hand, if Y informs X that it is uncertain
about m, this should be directly reflected in X’s opinion
about m.
Example 1 (Continued) Uncertainty. Consider the case
where Y informs X that it is unable to observe m. Here,
there is complete uncertainty with regard to the degree of
trustworthiness associated with Y ’s reports about m.
We can thus derive an additional desideratum:
desD2: if Y informsX that it is uncertain about
m, X is also uncertain about m.
In addition, we can identify an intermediate case, where
it is known that the current situation negatively affects the
degree of trustworthiness, and where an estimate of this ef-
fect can be determined. This is illustrated in the following
scenario.
Example 1 (Continued) Intermediate evidence. Suppose
that Y reports that its opinion about m is not accurate, but
there is some evidence in favour of m, and some evidence
against it (with some degree of uncertainty)1. In this case X
knows that the data received is somewhat accurate, and can
therefore derive a degree of trustworthiness in the informa-
tion regarding m received from Y .
This illustrates another desideratum regarding the dis-
counting of opinions, namely:
desD3: when the trustworthiness degree of a trustee
Y is derived from historical data, if Y informsX that
m holds with some degree of certainty,X should be-
lieve m less its trust in Y .
There are cases where the queried datum is not evidence
about a physical phenomenon, but rather an opinion about
another agent.
Example 1 (Continued) Reputation. Suppose that sensor
Y1 provides information about readings obtained from Y2,
an Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS).. Further suppose
that X wants to query Y2 about its battery status, but X
has, until now, only obtained its information directly from
Y1. Given a report from Y2, X can ask Y1 about Y2’s degree
of trustworthiness. According to our previous terminology,
the message that Y1 sends to X is the subjective — to Y1 —
trustworthiness degree of Y2.
1 An example of this is GPS data, which is known to be inaccurate
if you are using civilian equipment (Bisdikian et al 2012).
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Finally, there are cases where X has to integrate differ-
ent sources of information.
Example 1 (Continued) Consensus. Suppose that X
queries both Y1 and Y2 about a physical phenomenon m,
and let us suppose that it receives different answers from the
two sensors. In this situation, X will search for a consen-
sus between these opinions, and will be biased towards the
answer obtained from the more historically accurate sensor.
This illustrates a desideratum about fusing opinions:
desF1: in the case where X receives n opinions
about m from Y1, Y2, . . .Yn, there must exist an op-
erator informing which are X’s preferences among
each Yi (i.e. related to their degree of trustworthi-
ness), and X’s opinion about m should be derived
according to these preferences (i.e. giving more im-
portance to the opinion received from the most pre-
ferred trustee).
3 Background
In the above scenario, we utilised the terms trust, trustwor-
thiness, and reputation which often have different meanings
among different pieces of research. It is beyond the scope
of this paper to investigate these meanings; the interested
reader is referred to Castelfranchi and Falcone (2010) and
Urbano et al (2013) for an overview. For the purpose of
this paper we consider the notion of trustworthiness as the
property of an agent — the trustee — that a trustor is con-
nected with, where this property represents the willingness
of the trustee to share information accurately with respect to
the ground truth (we make a distinction between inaccuracy
that is intentional or otherwise). Moreover, reputation is a
property which represents the subjective view of an arbitrary
trustee’s trustworthiness that we obtained from an agent we
can directly communicate with.
Following (Jøsang et al 2007) we express both the de-
gree of trustworthiness and the degree of reputation using
SL. This formalism extends probability theory by expressing
uncertainty about the probability values themselves, which
makes it useful for representing trust degrees. We now pro-
ceed to provide a brief overview of SL mainly based on
(Jøsang 2001).
Like Dempster-Shafer evidence theory (Dempster 1968;
Shafer 1976), SL operates on a frame of discernment, de-
noted by Θ. A frame of discernment contains the set of pos-
sible system states, only one of which represents the actual
system state. These are referred to as atomic, or primitive,
system states. The powerset of Θ, denoted by 2Θ, consists
of all possible unions of primitive states. A non-primitive
state may contain other states within it. These are referred to
as substates of the state.
Definition 1 Given a frame of discernment Θ, we can as-
sociate a belief mass assignment mΘ(x) with each substate
x ∈ 2Θ such that
1. mΘ(x) ≥ 0
2. mΘ(∅) = 0
3.
∑
x∈2Θ
mΘ(x) = 1
For a substate x, mΘ(x) is its belief mass.
Belief mass is an unwieldy concept to work with. When
we speak of belief in a certain state, we refer not only to the
belief mass in the state, but also to the belief masses of the
state’s substates. Similarly, when we speak about disbelief,
that is, the total belief that a state is not true, we need to take
substates into account. Finally, SL also introduces the con-
cept of uncertainty, that is, the amount of belief that might
be in a superstate or a partially overlapping state. These con-
cepts can be formalised as follows.
Definition 2 Given a frame of discernment Θ and a belief
mass assignmentmΘ onΘ, we define the belief function for
a state x as
b(x) =
∑
y⊆x
mΘ(y) where x, y ∈ 2Θ
The disbelief function as
d(x) =
∑
y∩x=∅
mΘ(y) where x, y ∈ 2Θ
And the uncertainty function as
u(x) =
∑
y ∩ x 6= ∅
y 6⊆ x
mΘ(y) where x, y ∈ 2Θ
These functions have two important properties. First, they
all range between zero and one. Second, they always sum to
one, meaning that it is possible to deduce the value of one
function given the other two.
Boolean logic operators have SL equivalents. It makes
sense to use these equivalent operators in frames of discern-
ment containing a state and (some form of) the state’s nega-
tion. A focused frame of discernment is a binary frame of
discernment containing a state and its complement.
Definition 3 Given x ∈ 2Θ, the frame of discernment de-
noted by Θ˜x, which contains two atomic states, x and ¬x,
where ¬x is the complement of x in Θ, is the focused frame
of discernment with focus on x.
Let Θ˜x be the focused frame of discernment with fo-
cus on x of Θ. Given a belief mass assignment mΘ and the
belief, disbelief and uncertainty functions for x (b(x), d(x)
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and u(x) respectively), the focused belief mass assignment,
mΘ˜x on Θ˜
x is defined as
mΘ˜x(x) = b(x)
mΘ˜x(¬x) = d(x)
mΘ˜x(Θ˜
x) = u(x)
The focused relative atomicity of x (which approximates the
role of a prior probability distribution within probability the-
ory, weighting the likelihood of some outcomes over others)
is defined as
aΘ˜x(x/Θ) = [E(x) − b(x)]/u(x)
where E(x) represents the expected value of x.
For convenience, the focused relative atomicity of x is
often abbreviated aΘ˜x(x) or a(x).
An opinion consists of the belief, disbelief, uncertainty
and relative atomicity as computed over a focused frame of
discernment.
Definition 4 Given a focused frame of discernment Θ con-
taining x and its complement ¬x, and assuming a belief
mass assignment mΘ with belief, disbelief, uncertainty and
relative atomicity functions on x inΘ of b(x),d(x),u(x) and
a(x), we define an opinion over x, written ωx as
ωx ≡ 〈b(x), d(x), u(x), a(x)〉
For compactness, Jøsang also denotes the various func-
tions as bx,dx,ux and ax in place, and we will follow this
notation. Furthermore, given a fixed ax, an opinion ω can be
denoted as a 〈bx, dx, ux〉 triple.
Given opinions about two propositions from different
frames of discernment, it is possible to combine them in
various ways using SL’s various operators, as detailed in
(Jøsang 2001; Jøsang and McAnally 2004; Jøsang et al 2005,
2006; McAnally and Jøsang 2004). In this work we concen-
trate on Jøsang’s discount and fusion operators, which we
review next.
Definition 5 (Def. 5, Jøsang et al (2006)) Let A,B be two
agents where A’s opinion about B is expressed as ωAB =
〈bAB, dAB, uAB, aAB〉 and let x be a proposition whereB’s opin-
ion about x is acquired by A as the opinion ωBx =
〈bBx , dBx , uBx , aBx 〉. Let ωA:Bx = 〈bA:Bx , dA:Bx , uA:Bx , aA:Bx 〉 be
the opinion such that:


bA:Bx = b
A
B b
B
x
dA:Bx = b
A
B d
B
x
uA:Bx = d
A
B + u
A
B + b
A
B u
B
x
aA:Bx = a
B
x
then ωA:Bx is called the uncertainty favouring discounted
opinion of A. By using the symbol⊗ to designate this oper-
ation, we get ωA:Bx = ωAB ⊗ ωBx .
Definition 6 (Thm. 1, Jøsang et al (2006)) Let ωAx =
〈bAx , dAx , uAx , aAx 〉 and ωBx = 〈bBx , dBx , uBx , aBx 〉 be trust in x
from A and B respectively. The opinion ωA⋄Bx =
〈bA⋄Bx , dA⋄Bx , uA⋄Bx , aA⋄Bx 〉 is then called the consensus be-
tweenωAx andωBx , denoting the trust that an imaginary agent
[A,B] would have in x, as if that agent represented both A
and B. In case of Bayesian (totally certain) opinions, their
relative weight can be defined as γA/B = lim (uBx /uAx ).
Case I: uAx + uBx − uAx uBx 6= 0

bA⋄Bx =
bAx u
B
x +b
B
x u
A
x
uAx+u
B
x −uAx uBx
dA⋄Bx =
dAx u
B
x +d
B
x u
A
x
uAx+u
B
x −uAx uBx
uA⋄Bx =
uAx u
B
x
uAx+u
B
x −uAx uBx
aA⋄Bx =
aAx u
B
x +a
B
x u
A
x−(aAx+aBx ) uAx uBx
uAx+u
B
x −2 uAx uBx
Case II: uAx + uBx − uAx uBx = 0

bA⋄Bx =
(γA/B bAx+b
B
x )
(γA/B+1)
dA⋄Bx =
(γA/B dAx+d
B
x )
(γA/B+1)
uA⋄Bx = 0
aA⋄Bx =
(γA/B aAx+a
B
x )
(γA/B+1)
By using the symbol ‘⊕’ to designate this operator, we
can write ωA⋄Bx = ωAx ⊕ ωBx .
4 Core Properties and Requirements
In our scenario, agent X has to determine the trustworthi-
ness degree associated withm received from Yi.X will con-
sider three elements in reaching a decision:
1. trustworthiness: X has an opinion Ti concerning the
degree of trustworthiness of Yi;
2. certainty: Yi communicates that m holds with a degree
of certainty Ci;
3. combination:X has to combine T1, . . . , Tn with (resp.)
C1, . . . , Cn in order to achieve an ultimate opinionW =
Γ(W1, . . . ,Wn) on m, where ∀iWi = Ti ◦ Ci, i.e. Wi
is the result of a combination of opinion Ti with opinion
Ci, and each opinion Wi = Ti ◦ Ci has associated a
weight Ki = f(Ti) for some function f(·).
In particular, the three desiderata for discounting opin-
ions (desD1, desD2, desD3), give rise to the following
requirements for discounting:
rd1 if Ci is pure belief, then Wi = Ti;
rd2 ifCi is completely uncertain, thenWi = Ci (i.e. 〈0, 0, 1〉);
rd3 the degree of belief of Wi is always less than or equal to
the degree of belief of Ti;
and the desideratum about fusing opinion (desF1) gives rise
to the following requirements for fusion:
rf1 if ∀i, j Ki = Kj , then W = Γ(W1, . . . ,Wn) is the
opinion resulting from the average of W1, . . . ,Wn ;
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rf2 if ∃i s.t. Ki = 0, then Γ(W1, . . . ,Wn) =
Γ(W1, . . . ,Wi−1,Wi+1, . . . ,Wn).
While there is a direct correspondence between the desi-
deratum for discounting opinion (desD1, desD2, desD3)
and the requirements for discounting (rd1, rd2, rd3), the
desideratum about fusing opinion desF1 gives rise to two
(loose) requirements, rf1 and rf2. Note that the combina-
tion requirements describe the same “prudent” behaviour as
was presented in Example 1, in particular in the “belief” sce-
nario. Indeed even if X is highly confident in a specific con-
text, this confidence cannot increase the trust degree over the
base trustworthiness degree.
Following (McAnally and Jøsang 2004; Jøsang et al 2006),
we utilise SL to instantiate trustworthiness and confidence,
and seek to compute their combination through SL opera-
tions2. In doing so, we must therefore consider the following
inputs and requirements:
1. O = {〈b, d, u〉 ∈ R3|0 ≤ b ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ d ≤
1 and 0 ≤ u ≤ 1 and b + d + u = 1};
2. Ti = 〈bTi , dTi , uTi〉 derived by statistical observations
(e.g. (McAnally and Jøsang 2004));
3. Ci = 〈bCi , dCi , uCi〉 is the opinion received from Yi
about m;
4. ◦ : O×O 7→ O;
5. Γ : On 7→ O;
6. Wi =
{
Ti if Ci = 〈1, 0, 0〉
Ci if Ci = 〈0, 0, 1〉
further requiring that bWi ≤ bTi ;
7. given W = Γ(W1, . . . ,Wn), if ∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}Ki =
Kj , then
– bW =
1
n
n∑
i=1
bWi
– dW =
1
n
n∑
i=1
dWi
– uW =
1
n
n∑
i=1
uWi
8. if ∃i s.t. Ki = 0, then Γ(W1, . . . ,Wn) =
Γ(W1, . . . ,Wi−1,Wi+1, . . . ,Wn).
Although any function f(·) can be used for derivingKi,
hereafter we will consider Ti’s expected value, i.e. Ki =
bTi +
uTi
2 .
Since 1–5 above are inputs, we concentrate on the con-
straints expressed by 6, 7 and 8, which require us to con-
sider the problem of how to combine the degree of trust-
worthiness with the degree of certainty. Existing work, such
as (McAnally and Jøsang 2004; Castelfranchi and Falcone
2010; Urbano et al 2013), concentrate on computing T.
We begin by noting — as illustrated in Table 1 — that
no set of operators provided by SL (Jøsang 2001; Jøsang
2 Hereafter each opinion will have a fixed relative atomicity of 1
2
.
This assumption will be relaxed in future works.
and McAnally 2004; Jøsang et al 2005, 2006; McAnally
and Jøsang 2004; Jøsang 2008) satisfies the combination re-
quirements described previously.
Requirement satisfied?
Discount req. Fusion req.
Operator rd1 rd2 rd3 rf1 rf2
Addition (+) No No No No No
Subtraction (−) No No Yes No No
Multiplication (·) No No No No No
Division (/) No No No No No
Comultiplication (⊔) No No No No No
Codivision (⊓) No No No No No
Discounting (⊗) No Yes Yes No No
Cumulative fusion (⊕) No No No No No
Averaging fusion (⊕) No No No Yes No
Cumulative unfusion (⊖) No No No No No
Averaging unfusion (⊖) No No No No No
Table 1: Jøsang operators and the satisfaction of the five
combination requirements
In the next section we describe our proposals for the dis-
count — ◦ — and consensus — Γ — operators in order to
satisfy the above five requirements.
5 The Operators
5.1 A Naïve Discount Operator
As suggested by an anonymous referee of a preliminary ver-
sion of (Cerutti et al 2013b), a very naïve operator satisfying
the requirements rd1, rd2, and rd3 is the following.
Definition 7 Given the two opinions T = 〈bT , dT , uT〉 and
C = 〈bC , dC , uC〉, the naïve-discount of C by T is W =
T ◦n C, where:
– bW = bC · bT ;
– dW = bC · dT + dC ;
– uW = bC · uT + uC .
The following proposition shows that the naïve discount
operator fulfils the first three requirements.
Proposition 1 Given the two opinions T = 〈bT , dT , uT〉
and C = 〈bC , dC , uC〉, and W = T ◦n C, the naïve-
discount of C by T, then:
i. W ∈ O;
ii. if C = 〈1, 0, 0〉, then W = T, i.e. requirement rd1;
iii. if C = 〈0, 0, 1〉, then W = C, i.e. requirement rd2;
iv. bW ≤ bT , i.e. requirement rd3.
However, one of the limits of this naïve operator is that
if C = 〈0, 1, 0〉, the discounted opinion is pure disbelief.
This means that, regardless of the trustworthiness opinion
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an agent has on a source of information, if this source of
information informs the agent that it is certain in its disbelief
of a message, then the result of the discounting action is
complete disbelief.
Although this seems to be reasonable in some contexts,
e.g. in the merging of confidence and trustworthiness opin-
ions (as discussed in Cerutti et al (2013b)), it can be ques-
tionable in the context of discounting opinions (Kaplan 2013)
— intuition suggests discounting an opinion should (gener-
ally) raise the degree of uncertainty, while the naïve operator
reduces it.
In the following section we introduce a family of dis-
count operators, which can provide varying degree of uncer-
tainty when discounting opinions.
5.2 A Family of Graphical Discount Operators
As discussed in (Jøsang 2001), a Subjective Logic opinion
admits a geometrical representation inside a triangle, and,
as shown in (Jøsang et al 2005), operators can be defined in
order to satisfy graphical properties3.
As detailed in Appendix A, using the constraint that an
opinion’s belief, disbelief and uncertainty must sum to 1,
we can flatten the 3-dimension space O into a 2-dimension
space (Cartesian space).
Fig. 1: Projection of the certainty opinion and its combina-
tion with a trustworthiness opinion
Figure 1 depicts the intuition behind the family of dis-
count operators we introduce in this paper. In the figure, the
point T represents the subjective logic opinion regarding the
trustworthiness degree of the source of information. Given
this point, the four-sided figure PQDU represents the ad-
missible space of opinions, where P , 〈bT , 0, 1− bT〉, Q ,
〈bT , 1− bT , 0〉, D , 〈0, 1, 0〉, U , 〈0, 0, 1〉. In other words,
3 (Jøsang et al 2005) shows how the deduction operator affects the
space of possible derived opinions.
the opinions that are inside the admissible space clearly sat-
isfy requirement rd3, as their degree of belief cannot be
greater than bT .
Definition 8 Given an opinion T = 〈bT , dT , uT〉, the ad-
missible space of opinions given T is OT = {X ∈ O|bX ≤
bT}.
We can easily show that the line between P and Q as
shown in Fig. 1 delimits the admissible space of opinions
for T.
Proposition 2 Given an opinion T = 〈bT , dT , uT〉, and
its Cartesian representation, the four-sided figure PQDU
represents OT , where:
– P , 〈bT , 0, 1− bT〉; and
– Q , 〈bT , 1− bT , 0〉.
The idea behind the discount operator is as follows. An
opinion C should be projected into the admissible space of
opinions given T. According to Fig. 1, discounting the opin-
ion C with the opinion T means that we project C into OT
thus achieving a new opinion C′ which is the result of the
discounting operator. We consider only a linear projection in
this work, but more complex functions can be easily envis-
aged. In other words, the idea is that | #    »BC| ∝ | #     »TC′|, as well
as the angle αC ∝ αC′ .
The following definition describes the family of discount
operators obtained following the above intuition. Each mem-
ber of the family is identified by a specific value of αC′ .
Definition 9 Given the two opinions T = 〈bT , dT , uT 〉
and C = 〈bC , dC , uC〉, the graphical-discount of C by T
is W = T ◦αC′ C, where:
– uW = uT + sin(αC′)|
#     »
TC′|
– dW = dT +(uT −uW ) cos(π3 )+cos(αC′) sin(π3 )|
#     »
TC′|
where4:
–
αC ǫT
π
3
− βT ≤ αC′ ≤ ǫT − βT
– αC =


0 if bC = 1
arctan
(
uC sin(
π
3 )
dC + uC cos(
π
3 )
)
otherwise
– βT =


π
3
if dT = 1
arctan
(
uT sin(
π
3 )
1− (dT + uT cos(π3 ))
)
otherwise
– γT =
π
3
− βT
– δT =


0 if uT = 1
arcsin
(
bT
| #    »TU |
)
otherwise
4 With reference to Fig. 1, αC , ∠CBD , βT , ∠TDB , γT ,
∠TDU , δT , ∠TUD , ǫT , ∠DTU .
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– ǫT = π − γT − δT
– | #     »TC′| = |
#    »
BC|
| #         »BMC |
| #          »TMC′| =
= rC | #          »TMC′|
with rC = |
#   »
BC|
| #        »BMC | , and
| #          »TMC′| =


2 bT if αC′ =
π
2
2√
3
uT if αC′ = −π
3
2√
3
(1 − uT ) if αC′ = 2
3
π
2
√
tan2(αC′) + 1
| tan(αC′) +
√
3| bT otherwise
We can now show that this family of operators satisfy
the requirements rd1, rd2, and rd3.
Theorem 1 Given T = 〈bT , dT , uT〉, C = 〈bC , dC , uC〉,
and W = T ◦αC′ C, then:
i. W = 〈bW , dW , uW〉 is an opinion;
ii. if C = 〈1, 0, 0〉, then W = T;
iii. if C = 〈0, 0, 1〉, then W = C;
iv. bW ≤ bT .
In order to empirically examine the difference among
members of this family of operators, let us define the fol-
lowing three graphical discount operators. The first, ◦1, con-
siders the widest range of αC′ possible, projecting C in the
triangle
△
DTU . This operator is a “geometrical counterpart”
to the naïve operator — projectingC in
△
DTU could result in
an opinion with less uncertainty than T. The second opera-
tor, ◦2, raises the uncertainty of the discount opinion project-
ing C in the triangle
△
RTU . The third operator, ◦3, considers
the triangle
△
STU , where S is the intersection of the lineDU
with the bisector of the angle ǫT (this point is not shown in
Fig. 1).
Definition 10 Given the two opinions T = 〈bT , dT , uT 〉
and C = 〈bC , dC , uC〉:
– ◦1 is ◦αC′ with αC′ =
αCǫT
π
3
− βT ;
– ◦2 is ◦αC′ with αC′ =
αC(ǫT − βT)
π
3
;
– ◦3 is ◦αC′ with αC′ =
αC
ǫT
2
π
3
+
ǫT
2
− βT .
5.3 The Graphical Fusion Operator
In (Cerutti et al 2013a) we introduced a fusion operator which
satisfies requirements rf1 and rf2. Let us suppose we have
n opinionsW1,W2, . . . ,Wn derived using an operator ◦ s.t.
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n},Wi = Ti ◦ Ci. Intuitively, the fused opin-
ion Γ(W1,W2, . . . ,Wn) we want to obtain is the “balanced”
centroid of the polygon determined by the n opinions.
Definition 11 Given the opinions T1, T2, . . . , Tn,
C1, C2, . . . , Cn,W1,W2, . . . ,Wn s.t. ∀i ∈ {1 . . . n},Wi =
Ti ◦ Ci, the opinion resulting from the fusion of opinions
W1,W2, . . . ,Wn is
〈bΓ1(W1,...,Wn), dΓ1(W1,...,Wn), uΓ1(W1,...,Wn)〉 where:
– bΓ1(W1,...,Wn) =
1∑n
i=1Ki
(
n∑
i=1
Ki bWi
)
– dΓ1(W1,...,Wn) =
1∑n
i=1Ki
(
n∑
i=1
Ki dWi
)
– uΓ1(W1,...,Wn) =
1∑n
i=1Ki
(
n∑
i=1
Ki uWi
)
This definition of Γ1 satisfies the requirements rf1 and
rf2. Moreover, the following proposition shows that
Γ1(W1, . . . ,Wn) is an opinion, and its Cartesian represen-
tation is the balanced centroid of the polygon identified by
the points W1, . . . ,Wn.
Proposition 3 Given the opinions T1, T2, . . . , Tn, C1,
C2, . . . , Cn, W1,W2, . . . ,Wn s.t. ∀i ∈ {1 . . . n},Wi = Ti◦
Ci, and 〈bΓ1(W1,...,Wn), dΓ1(W1,...,Wn), uΓ1(W1,...,Wn)〉 the
opinion resulting from the fusion of opinions W1,W2, . . . ,
Wn, then:
i. 〈bΓ1(W1,...,Wn), dΓ1(W1,...,Wn), uΓ1(W1,...,Wn)〉 is an opin-
ion
ii. xΓ1(W1,...,Wn) =
1∑n
i=1Ki
(
n∑
i=1
Ki xWi
)
iii. yΓ1(W1,...,Wn) =
1∑n
i=1Ki
(
n∑
i=1
Ki yWi
)
6 Experimental Evaluation
In Section 2 we discussed the desiderata for the discounting
and fusion operators. In Section 4, we used these to obtain
requirements rd1, rd2, rd3, rf1, rf2, which our proposed
operator has been shown to fulfil.
In this section we focus on the design of an experiment
aimed at evaluating, from an empirical point of view, the
significance and usefulness of the desiderata and the require-
ments we identified for discounting and fusion operators. To
this end, we consider an experiment where an explorer agent
has to explore a network in order to determine the trustwor-
thiness degree of other members: some of them are directly
connected to the explorer, while for others it has to discount
reputational information it obtains in the form of opinions.
The evaluation is based upon the distance between the de-
rived opinion and the ground truth, i.e. the probability that
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each agent operates in a trustworthy manner. This likelihood
is instantiated with the system, and is not known by anyone
else in the network. This is just one of the possible scenario
where the discounting and fusion operators can be applied:
other empirical evaluations are left as avenues of future re-
search.
The experimental setup follows the one described in (Cerutti
et al 2013a): changes are highlighted in the text. In this
experiment each agent can communicate with all the other
agents in the network. In order to randomly generate these
networks, we consider a variable PL ∈ [0, 1] representing
the probability that an agent is connected5 to another agent
(we exclude self-connections). Note that we do not constrain
connections to be bidirectional6. In this experiment we set
PL to lie between 5 and 25 with increments of 5. For each
of the value of PL, we execute the following procedure.
6.1 Trust System Construction
We build a set of 50 agents A = {a1, . . . , a50}: each agent
ax is characterised by a knowledge base KBax and by the
probability of responding truthfully to another agent’s query,
namely PTax ∈ [0 . . . 1]. For each agent ax, we randomly
choose PTax .
We also require that (Ω = ⊤) ∈ KBax . In other words,
all the agents share the same information (Ω = ⊤) to be
read “ax knows that Ω is ⊤”.
For each agent ax, we determine if it can communicate
with ay 6= ax according to PL: if ay is connected to ax,
then we say that ay is a connection of ax (ay ∈ Nax).
Following the construction of the system, the experiment
proceeds through two distinct phases, namely bootstrapping
and exploration.
6.2 Phase I: Bootstrapping
The bootstrapping phase is similar to that described in Is-
mail and Jøsang (2002), where a β distribution is used for
analysing repetitive experiments and deriving a SL opinion.
In this experiment, each agent ax asks each of its connec-
tions ay ∈ Nax about Ω a number of times equals to #B .
Each time, ay provides a possible false answer, based on
the probability PTay only (the communications are stateless):
the two possible answers of ay are, of course, Ω = ⊤ and
Ω =⊥.
5 The term “connected” here can have different names in different
contexts, like “friend” in Facebook, or “follower” in Twitter.
6 Although this may seem counter-intuitive, it partially captures
real-world social media. For instance Twitter messages are public,
therefore we don’t know who will read our messages. The same applies
with slightly modifications to Google+, and, of course, to blogging ac-
tivities in general.
Agent ax counts the number of exchanges where ay an-
swered truthfully (#⊤) and when it lied (#⊥). Clearly,#B =
#⊤ +#⊥. Using this evidence, ax can form an opinion on
ay’s trustworthiness
Oayax = 〈
#⊤
#B + 2
,
#⊥
#B + 2
,
2
#B + 2
〉
which should be close (according to the definition of dis-
tance given in Def. 12) to the “ideal” (“real”) opinion the
(omniscient) experimenter has on ay , viz.
O
ay
Exp = 〈PTay , (1− PTay ), 0〉
Therefore, during the bootstrapping phase, each agent
ay ∈ Nax , ax records its opinion of ay in its knowledge
base.
In the experiment described in Cerutti et al (2013a), #B
varies between 25 and 250: however, as we noted in that
paper, this variation did not alter the experiment’s results.
Therefore, in this paper we collected data for ten different
values of #B varying it between 2 and 29 with a step size of
3.
6.3 Phase II: Exploration
After each agent has enriched its knowledge base with opin-
ions of its connections’ trustworthiness, an “explorer” aS ∈
A is randomly selected. The task of this explorer is to de-
termine the trustworthiness of each agent in the network.
The explorer, aS , acquires information about the network by
asking its connections “Who are your connections?”. Each
agent ay ∈ NaS answers this question according to PTay ,
which means that their answers are: for each ay ∈ Nax
Connectionsay ⊆ Nay (clearly if PTay = 1, then
Connectionsay = Nay ).
Agent aS collects all the answers and creates a set of
tuples associating agents that the explorer does not directly
know, and all the agents that have revealed that they have
connections to that agent, viz.:
M = {〈az, {ay1 , . . . , ayn}〉 | ∀i ∈ [1 . . . n] ayi ∈ NaS
and az ∈
n⋂
i=1
Nayi }
Then, for each pair of M, 〈az, {ay1 , . . . , ayn}〉, such
that az /∈ NaS ∪ {aS} (i.e. for each agent it is not directly
connected to), aS asks each ayi (i.e. those that are connected
to that agent) about Oazayi (i.e. their opinion of that agent).
ayi answers according to PTayi either O
az
ayi
or 〈bR, dR, uR〉
where 〈bR, dR, uR〉 is a SL opinion computed randomly
such that 〈bR, dR, uR〉 6= Oazayi . Since aS cannot determine
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whether the answer is true or not, we abuse notation, by as-
sociating Oazayi with the answer aS received from ayi to the
question “What is your opinion about az?”.
Subsequently, aS computes OazaS |J = (O
ay1
aS ⊗Oazay1 )⊕
. . .⊕ (OaynaS ⊗Oazayn ) (viz. the fusion of the discounted opin-
ions on az of its connections using Jøsang’s operators), and,
for each operator defined in Def. 7 and Def. 10 (i.e. ◦ ∈
{◦n, ◦1, ◦2, ◦3} ) OazaS |◦ = Γ1((O
ay1
aS ◦ Oazay1 ), . . . , (O
ayn
aS ◦
Oazayn ) (viz. the fusion of the discounted opinions on az of
its connections using the naïve operator, and the members of
the graphical operator family introduced in Def. 9 with the
fusion operator of Def. 11). Since we considered only one
fusion operator, viz. Γ1, we will write it without a subscript
to improve readability. Moreover, since we want to evaluate
the proposed operators and compare them to Jøsang’s ones,
each exploration has been performed with Jøsang’s opera-
tors and with only one of the proposed operators. We there-
fore explore the same network four times with Jøsang’s op-
erator. However, doing so guarantees that the evaluation of
each operator is independent from other evaluations.
Finally, each agent az is added to the list of the connec-
tions of aS and the process starts again by setting M = ∅
and querying each member of the connections until, in two
subsequent interactions, no further agents are added to aS’s
connections. This exploration process therefore enables aS
to form a picture of the agents in the network that does not
have a direct link to through the opinions of other agents.
Note that the results obtained through iteration j of the ex-
ploration phase serves to bootstrap iteration j + 1.
6.4 Computing the Distances.
For each agent az ∈ A\{aS}, for each ◦ ∈ {◦n, ◦1, ◦2, ◦3},
we compute the distance between the two derived opinions
OazaS |J and O
az
aS |◦, and the “ideal” opinion O
az
Exp. For this
purpose, we consider two notions of distance, namely a geo-
metrical distance, and a distance of expected values (Kaplan
2013).
The geometric distance between two opinions 〈bO1 , dO1 ,
uO1〉 and 〈bO2 , dO2 , uO2〉 is the Euclidean distance be-
tween the two point in the O space.
Definition 12 Given two opinions O1 = 〈bO1 , dO1 , uO1〉
andO2 = 〈bO2 , dO2 , uO2〉, the geometric distance between
O1 and O2 is
dG(O1, O2) =
√
(bO2 − bO1)2 + (dO2 − dO1)2 + (uO2 − uO1)2
Another interesting distance measure is difference be-
tween the expected values of subjective logic opinions. Let
us recall that the expected value for a subjective logic opin-
ion 〈bX , dX , ux, ax〉 is bx+ux ·ax. Given that we assume a
fixed base rate of 12 , the expected value simplifies to bx+
ux
2 .
Given the expected value of two opinions, we can easily
compute the distance between them.
Definition 13 Given two opinions O1 = 〈bO1 , dO1 , uO1〉
and O2 = 〈bO2 , dO2 , uO2〉, the expected value distance
between O1 and O2 is
dE(O1, O2) =
∣∣∣(bO1 + uO12
)
−
(
bO2 +
uO2
2
)∣∣∣
In other words, ∀az ∈ A \ {aS}, dG(OazaS |J , OazExp)
(reps. dE(OazaS |J , OazExp)) is the geometric distance (resp. ex-
pected value distance) between the derived opinion using
Jøsang’s operators and the “ideal” one (abbrev. dJG, resp.
dJE), and, ∀◦ ∈ {◦n, ◦1, ◦2, ◦3}, dG(OazaS |◦, OazExp) (resp.
dE(O
az
aS |◦, O
az
Exp)) is the geometric distance (resp. expected
value distance) between the derived opinion using either the
naïve operators or the operators of the family of graphical
discount operators (Def. 9) and the “ideal” one (abbrev. d◦G,
resp. d◦E ).
Finally, for each az ∈ A \ {aS}, ∀◦ ∈ {◦n, ◦1, ◦2, ◦3},
we compare the two computed distances obtaining the fol-
lowing scalar comparison values:
rG(az) =


− log
dG(O
az
aS |◦, O
az
Exp)
dG(O
az
aS |J , O
az
Exp)
if dG(OazaS |◦, O
az
Exp) >
dG(O
az
aS |J , O
az
Exp)
log
dG(O
az
aS |J , O
az
Exp)
dG(O
az
aS |◦, O
az
Exp)
if dG(OazaS |J , O
az
Exp) ≥
dG(O
az
aS |◦, O
az
Exp)
and
rE(az) =


− log
dE(O
az
aS |◦, O
az
Exp)
dE(O
az
aS |J , O
az
Exp)
if dE(OazaS |◦, O
az
Exp) >
dE(O
az
aS |J , O
az
Exp)
log
dE(O
az
aS |J , O
az
Exp)
dE(O
az
aS |◦, O
az
Exp)
if dE(OazaS |J , O
az
Exp) ≥
dE(O
az
aS |◦, O
az
Exp)
To strengthen the significance of the results, we mainly
concentrate on averages, and thus aS explores the network
|A|/2 = 25 times; we write rG(az) (resp. rE(az)) to denote
the average of the 25 computed logarithmic ratios using the
geometric distance (resp. expected value distance). More-
over rG(az) = averageaz∈A\{aS}r(az) (resp. rE(az) =
averageaz∈A\{aS}r(az)) is the average of the comparison
value over the whole set of agents using the geometric dis-
tance (resp. expected value distance).
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Fig. 2: Histogram and Gamma function fitting of dE(OazaS |J , O
az
Exp), Fig. (a), and of dG(OazaS |J , OazExp), Fig. (b).
7 Analysis of Experimental Results
To ensure that the outcomes are not biased by the random
generator, we run the same experiment ten times. Each run
follows the steps described in Sect. 6, and thus for each value
of PL, 10 networks have been generated randomly. More-
over, since each agent can lie, each generated network has
been explored 25 times. Therefore, for each run, for each
value of PL, 250 explorations over 10 different networks
have been carried on (i.e. 12500 explorations were consid-
ered in this experiment).
In Section 7.1 we make a qualitative analyse of the dis-
tributions of the distances computed using the two metrics
discussed in Definitions 12 and 13. Section 7.2 discusses the
results of the Wilcoxon signed-rank test on the measure of
distances. Finally, Sect. 7.3 provides a qualitative analysis
of the dynamics of the results varying the two parameters of
the experiment, namely the probability of connections PL
and the bootstrap time #B .
7.1 Distributions of Distances
We first analysed the distributions of the distances between
the ground truth and when using Jøsang’s operators (Figures
2a and 2b respectively); ◦1 and Γ1 (Figures 3a and 3b); ◦2
and Γ1 (Figures 3c and 3d), ◦3 and Γ1 (Figures 3e and 3f);
◦n and Γ1 (Figures 3g and 3h).
Visual inspection of Figures 2a, 3a, 3c, 3e, 3g indicates
that the distances computed using the expected value dis-
tance (Definition 13) can be approximated (qualitatively7)
using a Gamma function, regardless of the choice of the op-
erator.
This result looks reasonable with respect to the opinions
computed using Jøsang’s operators (Fig. 2a) due to the fact
that the experiment considered the Beta reputation system
7 Figures 2a, 2b, 3a, 3b, 3c, 3d, 3e, 3f, 3g, 3h, are obtained using the
Matlab function histfit.
Ismail and Jøsang (2002) and due to the statistical proper-
ties of Jøsang’s operators (see Jøsang et al (2006)). It is,
however, interesting to note that the use of ◦1 and Γ1, or
◦2 and Γ1, or ◦3 and Γ1, or ◦n and Γ1, all result in similar
graphs.
More interesting is the fact that, considering the graph-
ical distance (Figures 2b, 3b, 3d, 3f, 3h) we can conclude
that (qualitatively) Jøsang’s operators (and similarly ◦3 with
Γ1) are computing opinions whose geometric distance from
the ground truth is not distributed using a Gamma function
(Figures 2b and 3f). On the other hand, using either ◦1 with
Γ1 (Fig. 3b), or ◦2 with Γ1 (Fig. 3d), or ◦n with Γ1 (Fig. 3h)
returns opinions whose geometric distance from the ground
truth has a interesting and regular shape, which are similar
to a Gamma function or a Lognormal distribution. A com-
prehensive study of this is beyond the scope of the present
paper and is left for future work.
7.2 Analysis Using the Wilcoxon Test
Since the Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests reported that the dis-
tribution of the differences between each pair of distance
〈dE(OazaS |◦ , OazExp), dE(OazaS |J , OazExp)〉 (resp.
〈dG(OazaS |◦ , OazExp), dG(OazaS |J , OazExp)〉) are significantly dif-
ferent from normal distributions (p < 0.001), we analysed
them using the Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test (WSRT).
This test allows us to conclude whether or not the me-
dian of the differences of such pairs of distances is statis-
tically equal to 0. Moreover, looking at the median of the
distribution of each distance, we can also verify the signif-
icance of the direction of the difference. In other words, if
the distribution of dE(OazaS |◦ , O
az
Exp) has median equal to a
and the median of the distribution of dE(OazaS |J , O
az
Exp) is b,
we can verify the hypothesis that the difference is signifi-
cantly positive (if a > b) or negative (if a < b). Therefore,
if the difference is significant, this tests shows that one dis-
tance from the ground truth is significantly higher than the
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Fig. 3: Histogram and Gamma function fitting of dE(OazaS |◦ , O
az
Exp) (resp. dG(OazaS |◦ , OazExp)), for ◦ ∈ {◦1, ◦2, ◦3, ◦n} Fig.
(a), (c), (e), (g) (Fig. (b), (d), (f), (h)).
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Operator Md⋆ dE(OazaS |◦ , O
az
Exp
) Md⋆ dE(OazaS |J , O
az
Exp
) s− (×1010) s+ (×1010) z Incr. Performance†
◦1 0.141 0.144 4.11 4.53 −27.457‡ ≈ + 5%
◦n 0.156 0.155 4.40 3.95 −29.586‡ ≈ −5%
◦2 0.143 0.142 4.58 3.89 −45.559‡ ≈ −8%
◦3 0.163 0.145 5.12 3.51 −104.098‡ ≈ −19%
⋆ Median; † computed as (s+ − s−)/(s+ + s−); ‡p < 0.001.
Table 2: Wilcoxon signed-rank significance tests of distances derived using the expected value distance dE(·, ·). In grey are
the cases where the proposed operator ◦ ∈ {◦1, ◦2, ◦3, ◦n} did not outperform Jøsang’s operators. Results are ordered by the
increment of performance in descending order (i.e. the first row is the best one).
Operator Md⋆ dG(OazaS |◦ , O
az
Exp
) Md⋆ dG(OazaS |J , O
az
Exp
) s− (×1010) s+ (×1010) z Incr. Performance†
◦1 0.415 0.585 1.91 6.70 −310.462‡ ≈ +56%
◦n 0.454 0.608 1.93 6.42 −297.432‡ ≈ +54%
◦2 0.457 0.584 2.31 6.08 −248.968‡ ≈ +45%
◦3 0.607 0.593 4.92 3.72 −77.760‡ ≈ −14%
⋆ Median; † computed as (s+ − s−)/(s+ + s−); ‡p < 0.001.
Table 3: Wilcoxon signed-rank significance tests of distances derived using the geometric distance dG(·, ·). In grey are the
cases where the proposed operator ◦ ∈ {◦1, ◦2, ◦3, ◦n} did not outperform Jøsang’s operators. Results are ordered by the
increment of performance in descending order (i.e. the first row is the best one).
other. Furthermore, WSRT calculates the sum of the ranks of
the pairwise positive differences s+ and negative differences
s−. This can be used to indicated the size of this difference:
we consider the following simple formula for determining
this size which turns to be our measure of increment of per-
formance, namely (s+ − s−)/(s+ + s−) .
For improving the readability of the results, we grouped
the results of the WSRT test according to the type of dis-
tance used. Table 2 shows the results of the WSRT consid-
ering measure computed using the expected value distance
dE(·, ·), while Table 3 shows the results of the WSRT con-
sidering measure computed using the geometrical distance
dG(·, ·).
From Tables 2 and 3 we can conclude that, regardless of
the choice of the operator and the type of measure used, the
difference between the opinions determined with the pro-
posed operators and the Jøsang’s is significantly different
(p < 0.001).
Concerning the expected value distances, from Table 2
we can see that the WSRT highlights that in the case that
◦1 with Γ1 is used, the derived opinion is significantly (≈
+5%) closer to the ground truth than the opinion computed
using Jøsang’s operators. This is not true according to the
other choices of operators, which return opinion whose dis-
tance from the ground truth is greater (between 5% and 19%)
than Jøsang’s operator.
However, if we consider the graphical distances, from
Table 3 we can see that (in order) ◦1, ◦n, and ◦2, each of
which with Γ1, outperform Jøsang’s operators. Comparing
these increments of performances, we can also see that the
opinions derived using these operators are much closer to
the ground truth (between ≈ +56% and ≈ +45%) than
Jøsang’s operators.
7.3 Results w.r.t. Experiment Parameters
Considering the dynamics of the results, Figure 4 depicts the
mean and the standard deviation8 of rE(az) and rG(az) for
each set of operators used — viz. ◦1 and Γ1, ◦2 and Γ1, ◦2
and Γ1, ◦n and Γ1 — w.r.t. the two variables considered,
namely the probability of connections PL (Figures 4a and
4b), and the bootstrap time #B (Figures 4c and 4d).
Considering that distances computed using the expected
value distance measure, from Figure 4a we can infer that on
average Jøsang’s operators are performing better for small
values of probability of connections PL, and the greater the
PL, the better are the performance of operators ◦1, ◦n and
◦2 (each of which with Γ1). A visual inspection of Figure 4c,
however, does not highlight any specific pattern or regular-
8 Although in Sects. 7.1 and 7.2 we show that the distances are not
normally distributed and thus from a statistical point of view medians
rather than means should be considered. Here we are more interested in
the qualitative dynamics of values obtained by varying the parameters
of the experiment, and thus we rely on graphical representations of
mean and standard deviation.
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Fig. 4: Mean and Standard Deviation of rE(az) (resp. rG(az)) w.r.t. PL, Fig. (a) (resp. Fig. (b)), and w.r.t. #B , Fig. (c)
(resp. Fig. (d)). Please note that the scale is logarithmic.
ity in the dynamics of the system varying #B (considering
expected value distance).
On the other hand, if we consider the results derived us-
ing the geometric distance, Fig. 4b qualitatively shows that
the greater the probability of connectionsPL, the more sim-
ilar the operators we propose in this paper are to Jøsang’s.
In fact, the more connected the network, the more the boot-
strapping phase is important, and this is independent of the
choice of operators. However, when we are considering the
dynamics of the bootstrapping phase (Fig. 4d), we conclude
that the smaller the uncertainty (i.e. the greater the number
of interactions among the agents during the bootstrapping
phase), the better the proposed operators perform. It is worth
to notice that for #B = 2, which leads to a high uncertain
opinions, ◦1 and Γ1, ◦2 and Γ1, ◦3 and Γ1 perform similarly
to Jøsang’s operators, while choosing ◦n and Γ1 leads to a
significantly better result. We will investigate this interesting
results in future works.
7.4 Summary
To summarise our empirical evaluation, we observe that:
1. the operators ◦1, ◦2, ◦3, ◦n (in conjunction to Γ1), sim-
ilarly to Jøsang’s operators, return opinions whose ex-
pected value distance distribution from the ground truth
is close to a Gamma function (Figures 2a, 3a, 3c, 3g);
2. the operators ◦1, ◦2, ◦n (in conjunction with Γ1), dif-
fer from Jøsang’s operators and ◦3 with Γ1, and return
opinions whose geometric distance distribution from the
ground truth shows some qualitative regularity resem-
bling a Gamma function or a lognormal distribution (Fig-
ures 2b, 3b, 3d, 3h);
3. the operator ◦1 with Γ1 outperforms Jøsang’s operators
in a statistically significant manner, both considering the
expected value distance (≈ +5%) and the geometrical
distance (≈ +56%);
4. the rank of operators (each of which used in conjunction
with Γ1) w.r.t. their performances is independent from
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the choice of expected value distance, or geometrical
distance, and is as follows: ◦1 ≻ ◦n ≻ ◦2 ≻ ◦3;
5. the less the probability of connections, the more ◦ ∈
{◦1, ◦2, ◦3, ◦n} returns opinions closer (according to the
graphical distance) to the ground truth than Jøsang’s op-
erators;
6. the less the uncertainty (i.e. the more the bootstrap time),
the more ◦ ∈ {◦1, ◦2, ◦3, ◦n} returns opinions closer
(according to the graphical distance) to the ground truth
than Jøsang’s operators.
8 Conclusions and Future Works
The discount and the fusion operators play an important role
in standard Subjective Logic, and form the core of the Beta
Reputation System. In fact, they are used to combine and
discount reputation information from multiple agents within
a trust network.
In this paper, following our earlier work in Cerutti et al
(2013a,b), we introduced a set of intuitive desiderata that
operators for discounting and fusion of opinions should pro-
vide. From these, we derived a set of requirements and a
family of operators, and proved that these satisfy the desider-
ata, while Jøsang’s operators do not . We empirically evalu-
ated the derived operators in a trust scenario and the results
shown in Section 7 suggest that:
– one operator taken from the family satisfying the desider-
ata always outperforms Jøsang’s operators;
– according to the geometrical distance among opinions,
most of the operators satisfying the desiderata outper-
form Jøsang’s operators;
– there are relationships between the structure of the trust
network and the achieved increments of performances.
In particular, the Wilcoxon signed-rank significance test
discussed in Section 7.2, shows that the discounting opera-
tor (◦1), used in conjunction with the fusion operator Γ1, re-
turns opinions closer to the ground truth than Jøsang’s oper-
ators of 5% considering the expected value distance, and of
56% considering the graphical distance. Therefore, it seems
that allowing a reduction of the amount of uncertainty in
discounting opinion results on an increment of the perfor-
mances not only geometrically, but also when the expected
values are considered.
An empirical evaluation of the graphical operators on
real cases, e.g. (Guha et al 2004), is already envisaged as the
main future work. In addition, we want to develop graphical
operators analogous to other Subjective Logic operators, and
we intend to study these, as well as investigate their proper-
ties.
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A The Geometry of Subjective Logic
A SL opinion O , 〈bO , dO , uO〉 is a point in the R3 space, identi-
fied by the coordinate bO for the first axis, dO for the second axis, and
uO for the third axis. However, due to the requirement that bO+dO+
uO = 1, an opinion is a point inside (or at least on the edges of) the tri-
angle
△
BDU shown in Fig. 5, where B = 〈1, 0, 0〉, D = 〈0, 1, 0〉, U =
〈0, 0, 1〉.
Fig. 5: The Subjective Logic plane region
Definition 14 The Subjective Logic plane region
△
BDU is the trian-
gle whose vertices are the points B , 〈1, 0, 0〉, D , 〈0, 1, 0〉, and
U , 〈0, 0, 1〉 on a R3 space where the axes are respectively the one of
belief, disbelief, and uncertainty predicted by SL.
Since an opinion is a point inside triangle
△
BDU , it can be mapped
to a point in Fig. 6. This representation is similar to the one used in
(Jøsang 2001) for representing opinions in SL, but here the belief and
disbelief axes are swapped.
In order to keep the discussion consistent with Jøsang’s work (Jøsang
2001), in what follows we will scale triangle
△
BDU by a factor 1 :
√
3√
2
thus obtaining that | #       »B0B| = | #        »D0D| = | #      »U0U | = 1.
These geometric relations lie at the heart of the Cartesian transfor-
mation operator which is the subject of the next subsection.
A.1 The Cartesian Representation of Opinions
As shown in A, an opinion in SL can be represented as a point in a
planar figure (Fig. 6) laying on a Cartesian plane. In this section we
will introduce the Cartesian transformation operator which returns the
Cartesian coordinate of an opinion.
First of all, let us define the axes of the Cartesian system we will
adopt.
Fig. 6: An opinionO , 〈bO, dO, uO〉 in SL after the 1 :
√
3√
2
scale. The belief axis is the line from B0 (its origin) toward
the B vertex, the disbelief axis is the line from D0 toward
the D vertex, and the uncertainty axis is the line from U0
toward the U vertex
Definition 15 Given the SL plane region
△
BDU , the associated Carte-
sian system is composed by two axes, named respectively x, y, where
the unit vector of the x axis # »ex = 1| #   »BD|
#    »
BD, the unit vector of the y
axis #»ey = # »eu , and B is the origin.
Figure 7 depicts this Cartesian system.
Fig. 7: An opinion and its representation in the Cartesian
system
The correspondence between the three values of an opinion and the
corresponding coordinate in the Cartesian system we defined is shown
in the following proposition (proved in (Cerutti et al 2013b)).
Proposition 4 (Cerutti et al 2013b, Prop. 1) Given a SL plane region
△
BDU and its associated Cartesian system 〈x, y〉, an opinionO , 〈bO ,
dO , uO〉 is identified by the coordinate 〈xO, yO〉 s.t.:
– xO ,
dO + uO cos(
π
3
)
sin(π
3
)
– yO , uO
Proof Proving that yO , uO is trivial.
Let us focus on the first part of the proposition. Consider Figure 7.
Given O, we note that the for the point P , 1| #   »PO|
#    »
PO = #»eb (i.e. #    »PO is
parallel to the disbelief axis) and 1| #   »BP |
#    »
BP = 1| #   »BU |
#    »
BU (i.e. P is on the
line #    »BP ), and therefore ∠BPO = π2 . Then we must determine Q and
R s.t.
#    »
QR =
#    »
PO and yR = 0. By construction | #    »PO| = | #    »QR| = dO ,
∠QRB =
π
6
, ∠ORD =
π
3
, and xO , | #   »BS| = | #    »BR| + | #   »RS|, where
| #    »BR| = dO
sin(pi
3
)
, and | #   »RS| = uO
sin(pi
3
)
cos(π
3
).
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There are some notable elements of Fig. 7 that we will repeatedly
use below, and we therefore define them as follows:
– the angle αO determined by the x axis and the vector
#    »
BO;
– the three angles (γO , δO , and ǫO) of the triangle
△
ODU , namely
the triangle determined by linking the point O with the vertex D
and U through straight lines.
Definition 16 Given the SL plane region
△
BDU , given O = 〈bO , dO,
uO〉 whose coordinates are 〈xO, yO〉 where xO ,
dO + uO cos(
π
3
)
sin(π
3
)
and yO , uO , let us define and (via trivial trigonometric relations)
compute the following.
– αO , ∠OBD =

0 if bO = 1
arctan
(
uO sin(
π
3
)
dO + uO cos(
π
3
)
)
otherwise ;
– βO , ∠ODB =

π
3
if dO = 1
arctan
(
uO sin(
π
3
)
1− (dO + uO cos(π3 ))
)
otherwise
;
– γO , ∠ODU =
π
3
− βO;
– δO , ∠OUD =

0 if uO = 1
arcsin
(
bO
| #    »OU |
)
otherwise ;
– ǫO , ∠DOU = π − γO − δO;
where | #    »OU | =
√
1
3
(1 + dO − uO)2 + b2O .
The angle αO is called the direction of O.
Equivalently, we can write #    »BO or 〈B, αO, | #    »BO|〉.
Finally, as an element of SL is bounded to have its three compo-
nents between 0 and 1, we are also interested in determining the point
MO such that the vector
#          »
BMO has the maximum magnitude given (a)
the direction αO of an opinion O, and (b) MO is a SL opinion. In other
words, determining the magnitude of #          »BMO will allow us to re-define
the vector #    »BO as a fraction of #          »BMO .
Definition 17 Given the SL plane region
△
BDU , and O , 〈bO , dO,
uO〉 whose coordinates are 〈xO, yO〉 where xO ,
dO + uO cos(
π
3
)
sin(π
3
)
and yO , uO , and αO , ∠OBD = arctan
(
uO sin(
π
3
)
dO + uO cos(
π
3
)
)
,
let us define MO , 〈xMO , yMO 〉 as the intersection of the straight
line passing for O and B, and the straight line passing for U and D,
and thus define the following.
– xMO ,
2 − yO + tan(αO) xO
tan(αO) +
√
3
;
– yMO , −
√
3 xMO + 2.
B Proofs
Proposition 1 Given the two opinions T = 〈bT , dT , uT 〉 and C =
〈bC , dC , uC〉, and W = T ◦n C, the naïve-discount of C by T, then:
i. W ∈ O;
ii. if C = 〈1, 0, 0〉, then W = T, i.e. requirement rd1;
iii. if C = 〈0, 0, 1〉, then W = C, i.e. requirement rd2;
iv. bW ≤ bT , i.e. requirement rd3.
Proof
i. Let us prove that 0 ≤ bW ≤ 1, 0 ≤ dW ≤ 1, 0 ≤ uW ≤ 1.
To prove that bW ≥ 0, dW ≥ 0, and uW ≥ 0 is trivial since C
and T are opinions.
bW = bC · bT ≤ 1 is immediate since C and T are opinions.
dW = b ·dT+dC ≤ 1 can be rewritten as dT ≤ 1+ uCbC if bC 6= 0,
or dC ≤ 1 otherwise. Both in-equations are verified since C and
T are opinions.
uW = b·uT+uC ≤ 1 can be rewritten as dT ≤ 1+ dCbC if bC 6= 0,
or uC ≤ 1 otherwise. Both in-equations are verified since C and
T are opinions.
Finally, bW + dW + uW = bC (bT + dT + uT) + dC + uC = 1
ii. Given C = 〈1, 0, 0〉, W = T ◦n C is such that:
– bW = bC · bT = bT ;
– dW = bC · dT + dC = dT ;
– uW = bC · uT + uC = uT .
iii. Given C = 〈0, 0, 1〉, W = T ◦n C is such that:
– bW = bC · bT = 0 = bC ;
– dW = bC · dT + dC = dC ;
– uW = bC · uT + uC = uC .
iv. By contradiction, bW = bC · bT > bT leads to bC > 1, which is
impossible. ⊓⊔
Proposition 2 Given an opinion T = 〈bT , dT , uT 〉, and its Cartesian
representation, the four-sided figure PQDU represents OT , where:
– P , 〈bT , 0, 1 − bT 〉; and
– Q , 〈bT , 1 − bT , 0〉.
Proof By Definition 8, OT = {X ∈ O|bX ≤ bT}. From Prop. 4,
bX ≤ bT
yX ≥
√
3xX + 2(1 − bT)
uX ≥ 1− dX − bT
Therefore:
– if dX = 0, uX ≥ 1− bT (limit case 〈bT , 0, 1− bT 〉;
– if uX = 0, dX ≥ 1− bT (limit case 〈bT , 1− bT , 0〉 = Q). ⊓⊔
Theorem 1 Given T = 〈bT , dT , uT〉, C = 〈bC , dC , uC〉, and
W = T ◦αC′ C, then:
i. W = 〈bW , dW , uW〉 is an opinion;
ii. if C = 〈1, 0, 0〉, then W = T;
iii. if C = 〈0, 0, 1〉, then W = C;
iv. bW ≤ bT .
Proof Proving the thesis in the limit case is trivial. In the following we
will assume, without loss of generality, that αC′ 6= π2 , αC′ 6= −π3 ,
αC′ 6= 23π.(i.) W = 〈bW , dW , uW 〉 must respect
uW + dW ≤ 1 (1)
From Def. 9 it is clear that Equation 1 can be rewritten as follows.
uT + dT+
+
rC
2
2
√
tan2(αC′ ) + 1
| tan(αC′ ) +
√
3| bT (sin(αC′) +
√
3 cos(αC′)) ≤ 1
(2)
In turn, using the relation tan(αC′ ) =
sin(αC′ )
cos(αC′)
, this can be
rewritten as
uT + dT + rCbT ≤ 1
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which entails the requirement that rC ≤ 1−uT−dTbT =
bT
bT
= 1. How-
ever, from definition 9, we know that rC ≤ 1, fulfilling this require-
ment.
(ii.) C = 〈1, 0, 0〉 implies that | #    »BC| = 0 and thus rC = 0. There-
fore, from Def. 9, uW = uT + sin(αC′)rC |
#           »
TMC′ | = uT and this
results also implies that dW = dT . Since Point 1 shows that W is an
opinion in SL, we conclude that W = T .
(iii.)C = 〈0, 0, 1〉 implies rC = 1,
pi
3
ǫT
pi
3
−βT ≤ αC′ ≤ ǫT−βT ,
and thus αC′ = ǫT − βT = ǫT − βT = 23π − δt. Therefore, we
obtain that uW = uT + bT2 (1 +
√
3
tan(δT )
). From Definition 16 and
the trigonometric property that tan(arcsin(v)) = v√
1−v2 we obtain
that uW = uT + bT2 +
√
3
2
√
| #   »TU |2 − b2
T
. From Definition 16 we can
write:
uW = uT +
bT
2
+
√
3
2
1 + dT − uT√
3
=
1
2
(1 + bT + dT + uT ) = 1
(3)
Similarly, dW = dT + uT2 − 12 +
√
3
2
1
sin(δT )
bT = dT +
uT
2
−
1
2
+
√
3
2
| #   »TU |. From Def. 16 we have
dW = dT +
uT − 1
2
+
3
4
bT −
√
3
4
bT
1 + dT − uT√
3bT
=
1
4
(4dT + 2uT − 2 + 3bT − 1 + uT − dT ) = 0
(4)
From Equations 3 and 4, together with Point 1, it follows thatW =
〈0, 0, 1〉 = C.
(iv.) Suppose instead bW > bT .
1− dW − uW > 1− dT − uT
dW + uW < dT + uT
dT + sin(αC′ +
π
3
)
rC
sin(αC′ +
π
3
)
+ uT < dT + uT
rC < 0
but 0 ≤ rC ≤ 1. Quod est absurdum. ⊓⊔
Proposition 3 Given the opinions T1, T2, . . . , Tn, C1,
C2, . . . , Cn, W1,W2, . . . ,Wn s.t. ∀i ∈ {1 . . . n},Wi = Ti ◦ Ci, and
〈bΓ1(W1,...,Wn), dΓ1(W1,...,Wn), uΓ1(W1,...,Wn)〉 the opinion result-
ing from the fusion of opinions W1,W2, . . . ,
Wn, then:
i. 〈bΓ1(W1,...,Wn), dΓ1(W1,...,Wn), uΓ1(W1,...,Wn)〉 is an opinion
ii. xΓ1(W1,...,Wn) =
1∑n
i=1Ki
(
n∑
i=1
Ki xWi
)
iii. yΓ1(W1,...,Wn) =
1∑n
i=1Ki
(
n∑
i=1
Ki yWi
)
Proof (i.) To prove that 〈bΓ1(W1,...,Wn), dΓ1(W1,...,Wn), uΓ1(W1,...,Wn)〉
is an opinion, we have to show that uΓ1(W1,...,Wn)+dΓ1(W1,...,Wn) ≤
1 holds.
uΓ1(W1,...,Wn) + dΓ1(W1,...,Wn) =
1∑n
i=1Ki
(
n∑
i=1
Ki(uWi + dWi )
)
=
1∑n
i=1Ki
(
n∑
i=1
Ki(1− bWi )
)
= 1 − 1∑n
i=1Ki
(
n∑
i=1
Ki bWi
)
(ii.) From Prop. 4,

xΓ1(W1,...,Wn) =
dΓ1(W1,...,Wn)
sin(π
3
)
+
1
2 sin(π
3
)
∑n
i=1Ki
(
n∑
i=1
Ki uWi
)
xΓ1(W1,...,Wn) =
1
sin(π
3
)
∑n
i=1Ki
(
n∑
i=1
Ki (dWi +
uWi
2
)
)
Thus we obtain:
dΓ1(W1,...,Wn) = sin(
π
3
)
(
1
sin(π
3
)
∑n
i=1Ki
(
n∑
i=1
Ki (dWi +
uWi
2
)
)
+
− 1
2 sin(π
3
)
∑n
i=1Ki
(
n∑
i=1
Ki uWi
))
=
1∑n
i=1Ki
((
n∑
i=1
Ki (dWi +
uWi
2
)
)
−
(
n∑
i=1
uWi
2
))
=
1∑n
i=1Ki
(
n∑
i=1
Ki dWi
)
Since 1∑n
i=1Ki
(
n∑
i=1
Ki bWi
)
≥ 0, then uΓ1(W1,...,Wn) +
dΓ1(W1,...,Wn) ≤ 1 holds.
(iii.) Immediate from Prop. 4. ⊓⊔
